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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Sales And Service Warranties In Blood Transfusions
Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc'
Plaintiff, while a patient at a hospital, received transfusions of
whole blood supplied by the defendant blood bank, to whom payment
was directly made. The blood was contaminated and caused plaintiff
to contract serum hepatitis.2 The plaintiff and her husband sued for her
injuries, claiming that the defendant "sold" the blood to her, thereby
impliedly warranting its fitness and merchantability.' The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed, holding that there
could be no recovery on an implied warranty theory. This conclusion
was based on a multiplicity of factors and, from the opinion, it would
seem that the absence of any one of these factors might have produced
a different result. The injury here was unpreventable: medical science
has not yet developed a method for determining whether the serum
hepatitis virus is in fact present in the whole blood, nor can the virus
be killed without also destroying the blood's effectiveness. The defen-
dant was a charitable, non-profit institution rendering a necessary
service to the community. The plaintiff's physician was as well in-
formed of the inherent dangers of a blood transfusion as the defendant,
and this knowledge may be chargeable to plaintiff to create an assump-
tion of risk. Also, the blood transfusion transaction falls within the
sale-service distinction which precludes warranties from attaching in
a service contract. The court characterized a blood transfusion as a
sui generis activity in which legal concepts of both sale and service
are involved, but agreed with decisions from other jurisdictions that
the transaction is more in the nature of a service.
In denominating a blood transfusion a service rather than a sale,
the Minnesota court has continued the problematical sale-service dis-
tinction4 as a basis for finding no implied warranties in blood trans-
fusions. In effect, the court has said that because of the various factors,
no matter what a sales statute says about implied warranties, such a
defendant should not be held liable. Calling the transaction a service
effectuates this result. The courts have generally held that implied
warranties can arise only in sales contracts, and not under a contract
for service.5 No court which has thus far faced the problem of implied
warranties in blood transfusion cases has found that there was a sale
of the blood.'
1. 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1965).
2. Although it may in fact be impossible to prove that a particular blood trans-
fusion, rather than some other factor such as a contaminated instrument which
punctures the patient's skin, caused the hepatitis virus to be transmitted, the blood
bank did not dispute the causal issue. 132 N.W.2d at 807-08.
3. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 512.15 (1947); UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15.
4. "There are few legal topics perplexed by a greater number of irreconcilable
opinions .. " Finney v. Apgar, 31 N.J.L. 266, 268 (Sup. Ct. 1865).
5. See PROSSER, TORTS § 95 (3d ed. 1964) ; Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of
Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653 (1957).
6. See Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964);
WNhitehurst v. American National Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. 1965) ; Perl-
mutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) ; Dibblee v. Dr.
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Various tests for distinguishing between a sale and service have
been formulated for purposes of the Statute of Frauds. 7 The English
Statute of Frauds," the English Sale of Goods Act,9 the Uniform Sales
Act,10 and the Uniform Commercial Code" require a writing to enforce
a contract for the sale of goods but not for services. 2 One of the first
tests for distinguishing between sale and service was the so-called
"English rule," developed in Lee v. Griffin.'8 A contract to make a set
of false teeth was held to be a contract to sell. The test, as enunciated
by Lord Blackburn, was:
[I]f the contract be such that, when carried out, it would
result in the sale of a chattel, the party cannot sue for work and
labour; but, if the result of the contract is that the party has done
work and labour which ends in nothing that can become the sub-
ject of a sale, the party cannot sue for goods sold and delivered.14
This test still has some vitality today.' 5
What is known as the "essence test" was articulated by Chief
Baron Pollock in Clay v. Yates,'6 where a contract by a printer to
publish a treatise was held to be a contract for services. The test was
"whether work is the essence of the contract, or whether it is the
materials supplied."'" The later English cases came to prefer this
test over the "English rule."'" Probably indistinguishable from this
"essence" test is the "main object" test of Grafton v. Armitage,9
where a contract to devise a method to curve metal tubing was held
to be a contract for services. Chief Justice Tindal said that one must
look at the "substance" or "main object" of the contract in order to
determine the class to which it belongs.20
The American courts have also devised sale-service tests. The
"New York rule" of Crookshank v. Burrell2' is that if the contract is
W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile
v. Kennewick Public Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956), 59 A.L.R.2d
761 (1958); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50
(1964). See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 761, 777 (1958).
7. See Note, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 803, 804 (1955); Note, 43 IOWA L. Rxv. 95,
97 (1957).
8. 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 17 (1677).
9. 56-57 Vict., ch. 71, § 4 (1893) (repealed by the Law Reform [Enforcement
of Contracts] Act, 1954).
10. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 4.
11. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201.
12. The UNIFORM SALES AcT § 4(1) also requires a writing in a "contract to sell."
13. 1 B&S 272, 121 Eng. Rep. 716 (1861).
14. 121 Eng. Rep. at 718.
15. "It is submitted that the only relevant question to ask in these cases is that
which Lord Blackburn suggested in Lee v. Griffin, namely, has the contract resulted
in the sale of a chattel." Bartholomew, Contracts for the Sale of Goods and Con-
tracts for Work and Labour, 35 AUSTL. L.J. 65, 69 (1961).
16. 1 H&N 73, 156 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1856).
17. 156 Eng. Rep. at 1125.
18. See 40 CORNELL L.Q. 803, at 804 (1955).
19. 2 C.B. 336, 135 Eng. Rep. 975 (1845).
20. 135 Eng. Rep. at 977. See Samek, Contracts for Work and Materials and
the Concept of Sale, 36 AuSTL. L.J. 66, 70 (1962), which equates this "substance of
the contract" test with the "main object" test and finds some questionable distinctions
from the "essence" test.
21. 18 Johns. Rep. 58, 59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, 1820).
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for manufacturing of goods in the future, it is a contract for services
and not a sale.22 The "Massachusetts rule" of Mixer v. Howarth 2 3
and Goddard v. Binney24 is that all contracts for constructing custom-
made goods are for services if the product is not part of the supplier's
stock in trade for the general market. Most jurisdictions, including
Maryland, have read the "Massachusetts rule" into the Uniform Sales
Act.25 The Sales Act does not say that custom sales are not sales, but
merely that the Statute of Frauds, section 4 of the act, does not apply
to them. Thus, the "Massachusetts rule" is not the exclusive statement
of the service-sale distinction for purposes of the Uniform Sales Act.
The first court to decide a blood transfusion warranty case was the
New York Court of Appeals in Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.2 6
Plaintiff had contracted serum hepatitis from a blood transfusion and
sued the defendant hospital for breach of a Sales Act implied warranty.27
In holding that there was no warranty because there was no sale, the
court combined the "essence" and "main object" tests: "While deter-
mination, as to whether the essence of a particular contract is for the
rendition of services or for the sale of property, may at times be trouble-
some and vexatious, there is no doubt that the main object sought
to be accomplished in this case was the care and treatment of the
patient."2 In formulating its sale-service test for warranty, the court
relied on cases which used the distinction for purposes of the Statute
of Frauds,29 a zoning ordinance,3" and a sales tax statute." This
"essence-main object" test has since been the one primarily used by the
courts in dealing with warranties in blood transfusions.2
There is much reason to doubt the validity of any of these Statute
of Frauds tests for purposes of implied warranty. Determinations of
22. This test is actually based on the conclusion of Lord Loughborough in
Rondeau v. Wyatt, 2 H.BI. 63, 126 Eng. Rep. 430, 432 (1792), that the provision of
the Statute of Frauds which applied to contracts for the sale of goods extended to
executory contracts but not to cases involving "work and labour to be done" and
"materials to be found." See also Lord Tenterden's Act, 9 Geo. 14, ch. 14, § 7 (1828),
which eliminated this distinction while codifying the application of the Statute of
Frauds to executory contracts.
23. 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 205 (1838).
24. 115 Mass. 450 (1874).
25. See, e.g., Stem v. Crawford, 133 Md. 579, 105 Atd. 780 (1919); Willard v.
Higdon, 123 Md. 447, 91 Atl. 577 (1914) ; Berman Stores Co. v. Hirsh, 240 N.Y. 209,
148 N.E. 212 (1925). But see E. G. Young Lumber Co. v. New York Bondstone
Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 985, 179 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1958), which held contra to the "Massa-
chusetts rule." See 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 55 a (rev. ed. 1948) ; Note, 40 CORNELL
L.Q. 803, 805 (1955) ; Note, 43 IOWA L. REv. 95, 103 (1957).
26. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (a 4-3 decision).
27. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15.
28. 123 N.E.2d at 795.
29. Racklin-Fagin Constr. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220, 281 N.Y.S. 426 (1935)
Robinson v. Graves [1935] 1 K.B. 579.
30. Town of Saugus v. B. Perini & Sons, Inc., 305 Mass. 403, 26 N.E.2d 1 (1940).
31. Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 I1. 626, 12 N.E.2d 635 (1937). Note also that the
Perlmutter court, 123 N.E.2d at 794, cited Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah
264, 67 P.2d 632, 11 A.L.R. 331 (1937), in support of the "essence-main object" test,
but the Hintze court not only did not use the "essence-main object" test, but very
questionably ignored the express language of the Sales Act limiting the "Massachu-
setts rule" to the Statute of Frauds, section 4, and held that the policy of section 4
extended to the entire act. The court then found that a custom job was not a sale
for purposes of determining whether the seller could assert a lien.
32. See cases cited note 6 supra.
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whether a transaction is a sale or service for purposes of the Statute
of Frauds are made by courts as a basis for deciding whether some-
one can avoid a contract because it was not in writing. But when the
Statute of Frauds itself is not an issue, the tests used for determining
whether someone has complied with its provisions should be irrelevant,
the policy questions being different.3 3 The Minnesota court seems to
have sensed this, and, while not disavowing the Perlmutter rule, was
careful to utilize additional considerations for its holding.
Once the sterile sale-service distinction based on irrelevant cases
is abandoned, which the Balkowitsch court could not bring itself to do
entirely, there are several means which can be used to hold a supplier
of defective blood liable on a warranty theory. The dissent in Perl-
mutter suggested a severability technique, whereby the contract is
divided into one for sale and one for service. 4 This method would find
a supplier of blood liable even with the "essence-main object test." In
determining what the essence of the contract is, only those services
specifically related to the transfusion are considered. The general
services provided by the hospital are part of a separate contract not
dealing with the blood transfusion. The result is a finding that the
essence or main object of the blood transfusion contract is the trans-
fused blood. 5
The most satisfactory technique is that employed by the British
courts in similar situations. When a transaction involves legal con-
cepts of both sale and service, those courts, instead of carrying over
the tests used in the Statute of Frauds area, imply a warranty that the
materials used are fit for the purpose.36 Although the Sales Act does
not expressly limit warranties to sales transactions, American courts
have not considered whether a warranty might be implied without a
sale in the blood transfusion situation. The British method would
allow such a result, and it is surely a more logical system. If A supplies
B with a chattel for a price, the law calls the transaction a sale and
implies a warranty of fitness. But if A administers as well as supplies,
the warranties do not attach according to the Perlmutter rule. What
was at first a sale becomes no longer a sale when service accompanies
the transaction; the greater the extent to which a receiver of goods is
33. See the comment of Professor Williston, one of the drafters of the Uniform
Sales Act: "It would be indeed unfortunate if the strained construction which has
been adopted in order to evade the Statute of Frauds should be applied in other
classes of cases." 3 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 25, § 563. See also Note, 43 IowA
L. Pav. 95, 105-07 (1957).
34. 123 N.E. 2d at 796. New York found no great difficulty in making a similar
distinction between administrative and medical acts. See, e.g., Holtfoth v. Rochester
General Hosp., 304 N.Y. 27, 105 N.E.2d 610 (1952), 31 A.L.R.2d 1113 (1953) ; Iacono
v. New York Polyclinic Medical School & Hosp., 269 App. Div. 955, 58 N.Y.S.2d
244 (1945), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 502, 68 N.E.2d 450 (1946) ; Walk v. City of New York,
284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596 (1940).
35. See Note, 1965 Wis. L. Riv. 374, 383, for a favorable comment on this method.
36. Dodd v. Wilson, [1946] 2 All E.R. 691 (K.B.) (defendant vaccinated plain-
tiff's cattle with defective vaccine) ; Sammuels v. Davis, [1943] 2 All E.R. 3 (C.A.)(dentist impliedly warranted denture - indication of a warranty of services) ; Watson
v. Buckley, [1940] 1 All E.R. 174 (K.B. 1939) (defendant used defective lotion in
dyeing plaintiff's hair) ; G. H. Myers & Co. v. Brent Cross Service Co., [1934] 1 K.B.
46, 150 L.T.R. 96 (1933) (defendant used defective rods in repairing plaintiff's
automobile).
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at the mercy of the supplier's skill and judgment, the less the supplier's
liability. The British courts, by declining to call the transaction a
service,3T have refused to so diminish the supplier's responsibility as
reliance increases.
In certain areas such as leases of chattels, American courts have
extended implied warranty liability to non-sale situations."8 The
Uniform Sales Act could have aided the growth of warranty in the
non-sale area by offering a basis for analogy; however, the act has
evidently hindered this growth, since the courts have generally assumed
that the specific Sales Act warranties were the only ones applicable.8 9
The fallacy of this reasoning is most apparent in the area of blood
transfusions. The courts have been forced to say that there is no sale
in blood transfusions because they feel that such a holding is necessary
to preclude implied warranties. On the other hand, when someone
eats a meal in a restaurant, many courts agree there is a sale,4" although
the elements of service involved are certainly substantial.4 The result
is a confusing and inconsistent state of the law; for instance, what is
the result when a hospital supplies bad food to a patient ?42
At any rate, the methods for holding a supplier of bad blood liable
are available: apply the "Massachusetts rule" (the test generally applied
under the Sales Act) ; sever the contract into contracts for sale and
service; or, without finding a sale, imply a warranty of materials. What
accounts for the reluctance of the courts to employ one of these methods?
37. In the instant Balkowitsch case, the service argument is particularly weak,
since we are dealing not with a hospital but with a blood bank. In Perlmutter the court
rationalized its decision on the ground that "the supplying of blood by the hospital
was entirely subordinate to its paramount function of furnishing trained personnel
and specialized facilities in an endeavor to restore plaintiff's health." 123 N.E.2d
at 795. But the service argument in the case of a blood bank is less significant, because
it is not the blood bank but the hospital which furnishes the services to the patient;
the blood bank merely supplies the blood. The Minnesota court in Balkowitsch
refused to make this distinction, saying that a blood bank should not "be characterized
as a commercial business which offers its products for sale in the market place in
competition with others for the sole motive of making a profit." 132 N.W.2d at 810.
See also Whitehurst v. American National Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. 1965),
where the court, relying on Balkowitsch, found the blood bank not liable. Cf. Koenig
v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964), where
plaintiff commenced an action against a hospital and blood center, but dropped the
action against the blood center, probably because of lack of privity. It might be
possible for a blood bank to argue that in collecting blood from a variety of donors
it is in effect merely performing one facet of a hospital's services. See Note, 42 MINN.
L. Rev. 640, 659-60 (1958).
38. See Greene v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
39. See Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 653-54.
40. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 95. See UNIVORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
§ 2-314(1): "Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be con-
sumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale." For an argument that an
analogy to the sale of food can be applied to Balkowitsch under the U.C.C., see Note,
15 DE PAUL L. Rlv. 203, 207-10 (1965).
41. The Perlmutter court rejected any analogy between a customer in a restaurant
and a patient in a hospital, 123 N.E.2d at 796:
[W]hen one goes into a restaurant, he does so in order to buy what the
restaurant in truth has to sell, namely, food. That is not so, though, when one
enters a hospital as a patient; he goes there, not to buy medicines or pills, not
to purchase bandages or iodine or serum or blood, but to obtain a course of treat-
ment in the hope of being cured of what ails him.
42. See Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 662.
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The principal reason is probably that there is no way of preventing
some of the injuries caused by bad blood.
The bad blood cases can be roughly divided into two categories:
those where incompatible blood types are transfused, and those where
the blood itself is diseased or contaminated prior to transfusion. For
purposes of implied warranty, both kinds of cases have been treated
similarly in that the courts have said there is no sale.4" In the "incom-
patible" blood cases, the negligence theory of recovery is often utilitzed."
But negligence is not an especially useful theory in the "diseased" blood
area, unless the disease transmitted is syphilis. The syphilis agent can
be destroyed by chilling the whole blood; consequently, failure to chill
should be grounds for negligence.4" The other two most frequently
transmitted diseases are malaria and serum hepatitis. Malaria can be
detected in the whole blood only by means of an extensive, detailed
microscopic examination.46 Serum hepatitis cannot be detected in the
donors or in the whole blood at all.47 The result is that in these two
diseases4 the possibility of proving negligence for failure to detect the
disease is virtually nil, and it is unlikely that any other form of a negli-
gence argument will be successful.4" Thus, the only way a plaintiff is
43. It has been suggested that in the "incompatible" blood cases the blood supplier
should be held to warranty liability, but in the "diseased" blood cases no warranties
should attach. See 33 Miss. L.J. 253, 256 (1962). Others feel that there is nojustification for such a distinction. See Note, 42 MINN. L. Rtv. 640, 660 (1958).
44. See, e.g., Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142(1951); Berg v. New York Soc'y for the Ruptured & Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d 499,
136 N.E.2d 523 (1956); Necolayff v. Genessee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d
832 (1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
45. See Note, 42 MINN. L. Rnv. 640, 658 (1958).
46. Id. at 657.
47. Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805,
807 (Minn. 1965). In pooled blood plasma, the virus is equally non-detectable, but
there are procedures available today for destroying the virus. Note, 1965 Wis. L.
Rimv. 374, 385. Hence, the negligence theory is available for a hepatitis injury in the
case of plasma.
48. For a discussion as to other diseases which could possibly be transmitted
in blood, such as allergic states, brucellosis, influenza, measles and respiratory infec-
tion, see Weiner, Grant, Unger and Workman, Medicolegal Aspects of Blood Trans-fusion, 151 A.M.A.J. 1435, 1438-40 (1953).
49. See Merck & Co. v. Kidd, 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957) (theory that blood
plasma was an adulterated drug within the Food and Drug Act which made sale of an
adulterated drug negligence per se not sustained) ; Fischer v. Wilmington Gen.
Hospital, 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (1959) (considering the detrimental effect of
advising plaintiff of the risk, defendant did not have a duty to advise plaintiff in
advance that hepatitis might be communicated) ; Hidy v. State, 207 Misc. 207,
137 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1955), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 664, 151 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1956), aff'd,
3 N.Y.2d 756, 163 N.Y.S.2d 985, 143 N.E.2d 528 (1957) (unsuccessful attempt to find
the state liable as the distributor for Red Cross pooled blood plasma) ; Parker v.
State, 280 App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1952) (unsuccessful attempt to find
state liable as a distributor since medical profession is aware of risk and state has a
right to rely on judgment of medical profession). See also Sloneker v. St. Joseph's
Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964) (dismissal of negligence claim during dis-
covery procedure was premature, notwithstanding unlikelihood that plaintiff could
establish a duty of defendant to warn plaintiff of the danger).
Since the courts seem to feel that there is no duty to warn of the danger, a
patient will, in all probability, receive a blood transfusion without any knowledge
that he takes a risk of contracting disease. A prevalent practice today is to place
a warning on the label of the blood bottle that the blood may contain the serum
hepatitis virus. Such a warning is in the nature of a fine print disclaimer clause in a
contract. It is absurd to think that a patient on an operating table will read the label
and become cognizant of the risk.
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likely to recover in such an instance is by holding the hospital or blood
bank strictly liable in either tort or warranty.
Hence, the real issue in all of the bad blood cases is not whether
there was a technical sale, but whether as a matter of policy suppliers
of blood should be held strictly liable for a foreseeable ° but unprevent-
able injury. In this respect, it is time that the courts began looking at
the reasons for implying a warranty, rather than the fatuous sale-service
distinctions. There are two basic reasons for imposing on a manu-
facturer or supplier a warranty type of strict product liability: the
deterrent effect - insurance that the manufacturer or supplier is
especially diligent in inspecting for and preventing defects - and the
distribution of loss and risk.5 In the case of blood transfusions, any
deterrent effect of strict liability would be negligible. Both hospitals
and blood banks are organizations devoted to saving human life, 52
and to hold them strictly liable would not be likely to exact more
diligence than to hold them liable merely for their negligence.53 In
the "diseased" blood cases in particular, the deterrent effect is unim-
portant, since the diseases are mostly undetectable.
If, then, we are to hold a supplier of bad blood strictly liable, it
is for the second effect of strict product liability - distribution of
loss and risk. It is generally conceded that this reason is in fact the
most significant justification for strict product liability today,54 and
the impact of liability insurance on modern transactions is especially
relevant. When the supplier can foresee the risk, he can insure against
it and meet the cost of the insurance by raising the price of the product
or enterprise. In this way, the loss is distributed to those who use the
product or engage in the enterprise.55 Such a solution seems eminently
more fair than to allow the full loss to fall upon the particular in-
S0. Serum hepatitis will be transmitted to one out of every two hundred people
receiving a whole blood transfusion, and may cause death in one out of every six
thousand transfusions. See Weiner, Grant, Unger, and Workman, supra note 48,
at 1437. Serum hepatitis, being foreseeable although unpreventable, is distinguishable
from lung cancer from cigarettes as presented in cases such as Ross v. Philip Morris
& Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964), discussed in 24 MD. L. Rtv. 462 (1964).
51. See Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 670; Comment, 63 COLUM. L. Rnv. 515,
530 (1963).
52. The charitable nature of such institutions obviously has had an impact on the
courts. For an extreme example, see Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints
Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1961) : "We think that practically all
hospitals are bourns of mercy and most physicians are unselfish disciples of relief
and the cure of human ills .... No hospital gives green trading stamps on the occasion
of a blood transfusion as some commodity vendors do, or a car for one having the
lucky blood purchase order number." Such thinking seems blatantly anachronistic
in an age which is abrogating the doctrine of charitable immunity. See generally
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 127; 19 MD. L. REv. 87 (1959).
53. See 103 U. PA. L. REv. 833, 835 (1955). But see Farnsworth, supra note 5,
at 672, for an argument that strict liability would induce hospitals to intensify their
research for methods of detecting blood defects.
54. See Comment, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 515, 531 (1963).
55. Legal scholars have differed as to whether it is desirable for society to spread
the risk of loss in such a manner. Compare HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881):
"[Slound policy lets losses lie where they fall, except where a special reason can be
shown for interference;" with POUND, THe SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 189 (1921) :
"There is a strong and growing tendency, where there is no blame on either side,
to ask in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear the loss."
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dividual who is the unfortunate victim of the product's deficiency. 56
Some feel that while it is usually better to shift the risk of loss to the
manufacturer or supplier, this should not be done when no amount of
care can prevent the product from being unsafe.57 However, as long
as the risk is foreseeable, there does not seem to be an adequate justifi-
cation for this distinction, since the supplier's ability to insure and dis-
tribute the loss is not affected by his inability to prevent the harm.58
Unquestionably, the Balkowitsch court has moved beyond Perl-
mutter in articulating a rationale for not holding suppliers of defective
blood liable. But the Balkowitsch court has likewise failed to ask the
right questions. The issue is: do the reasons for implying a warranty
apply? The charitable nature of the defendant and the unpreventability
of the injury are no more relevant than whether we call the transaction
a sale or service. It is just as easy for a non-profit blood bank to
insure against the risk as it is for a profit-making organization, and
the fact that the injury is unpreventable but foreseeable by the blood
bank should be all the more reason to require it to insure.
The assumption of risk argument is somewhat more troublesome.
It is generally recognized that assumption of risk is a defense to a
warranty action, but the plaintiff must be fully aware of the particular
risk and voluntarily expose himself to it.59 The Minnesota court sug-
gested that there was an assumption of risk in the blood transfusion
situation, since plaintiff's physician knew of the danger. 0 This is
56. See James, General Products - Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923 (1957):
The proposition is this: Strict liability is to be preferred over a system of
liability based on fault wherever you have an enterprise or activity, beneficial
to many, which takes a more or less inevitable accident toll of human life and
limb. This is true at least where the accident victims are as a class economically
ill-equipped to carry the burden of serious accident losses. The impact of such
losses on the individual in terms of human hardship is often crushing, and the
repercussions of this blow reach far beyond the individual and pose a significant
social problem.
See also 103 U. PA. L. Rlv. 833, 836 (1955).
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402a, comment k (1965). While this
section holds a seller strictly liable for defects in his product, comment "k" makes an
exception in the case of "unavoidably unsafe products." Although the comment talks
specifically of "drugs, vaccines, and the like .. ", Chief Justice Traynor of the
California Supreme Court has called blood a "classic example" of an "unavoidably
unsafe produce." Traynor, The Ways and Meaning of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367 (1965).
58. For general discussion as to risk distribution, see Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) ; Morris, Enter-
prise Liability and the Actuarial Process - The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE
L.J. 554 (1961) ; Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 335 (1924).
From the beginning, the courts have been aware that there is a risk allocation
issue in the blood transfusion problem. However, rather than consider the supplier's
ability to distribute the risk to those receiving blood transfusions, the early cases
seemed to feel that sounder policy required that anyone who entered a hospital assumed
the risk of contracting serum hepatitis by means of a blood transfusion, despite the
fact that he probably was unaware that there was a risk involved. See Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954): "The art of healing
frequently calls for a balancing of risks and dangers to a patient. Consequently, if
injury results from the course adopted, where no negligence or fault is present, liability
should not be imposed upon the institution or agency actually seeking to save or other-
wise assist the patient."
59. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 95.
60. The court does not refer to the phrase "assumption of risk," but merely uses
the fact that "plaintiff's physician has the same information, knowledge, and experience
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hardly an acceptable analysis. Whatever agency arguments may be
made, the fact remains that since the courts have held there is no duty
to warn, as a practical matter the plaintiff will never know of the danger
and will not have voluntarily exposed himself to it. Although the plain-
tiff may well go through with the blood transfusion even if he knows
of the risk, it is grossly inequitable to use legal reasoning to impute
knowledge to him which in fact he will never have."' Like the service-
sale distinction, imputation of the physician's knowledge to the plaintiff
for an assumption of risk defense is merely a pigeonhole into which a
holding can fall, rather than a rational analysis of policy. Even though
both defendant and plaintiff may be innocent parties in the blood trans-
fusion situation, only one knows of the risk and can distribute it.
Perhaps a policy which requires a supplier of chattels to be held
strictly liable primarily because he is in the best position to spread the
loss is, at present, too revolutionary a concept to become law by judicial
extension. Legislative action may ultimately be necessary. However,
those legislatures which have acted have taken the opposite approach
and made transactions in blood "services" as a matter of law, thereby
employing the same fiction as the courts.6 2
The Uniform Commercial Code presents a new legislative expres-
sion of the law governing the sale of goods. For purposes of the blood-
transfusion warranty problem, the Code is different from the Uniform
Sales Act. The Sales Act defined a sale as "an agreement whereby
the seller transfers the property in the goods to the buyer for a con-
sideration called the price.""3 The Code says, "A 'sale' consists in the
passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price. '"" The Code
section dealing with the scope of article 265 provides that "unless the
as the supplier" as one of the bases of its holding. See Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis
War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Minn. 1965).
61. Even if a court should decide that there is a technical assumption of risk,
which the Minnesota court merely suggests, it could well be argued that as a matter
of public policy defendant should still be liable. Cf. Tunkl v. Regents of University
of California, 32 Cal. Rep. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
62. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1606:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma, blood
products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing
the same, or any of them, into the human body shall be construed to be, and is
declared to be, for all purposes whatsoever, the rendition of a service by each
and every person, firm, or corporation participating therein, and shall not be
construed to be, and is declared not to be, a sale of such whole blood, plasma,
blood products, or blood derivatives, for any purpose or purposes whatsoever.
In Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rep. 320,
79 A.L.R.2d 290 (1960), the court held that this statute did not apply to Salk polio
vaccine even though a horse blood component was used as part of a culture medium.
The court found the vaccine manufacturer liable despite the absence of a technical
sale from defendant to plaintiff. For a dubious argument that a blood transfusion is
a service, but a polio inoculation is a sale, see Note, 65 YALE L.J. 262, 269 n.36 (1955).
The legislative intent manifested by the California statute would probably preclude
recovery for a serum hepatitis injury even on a non-sales implied warranty theory.
The intent in the Arizona statute is even clearer; there, transfusions of blood "shall
be construed as to the transmission of serum hepatitis to be the rendition of a
service .. " ARIZ. Rev. STAT. art. 5, § 36-1151 (Supp. 1964). A pending Wisconsin
statute, Wis. Bill 218S (1965), would make transactions in blood products "and
other human tissues such as corneas, bones or organs" services as a matter of law.
63. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 1(2).
64. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(1).
65. Id. at § 2-102.
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context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in
goods;" and reference is made throughout the warranty sections66 to
the "seller" of goods. Consequently, the old distinction between what
is and what is not a sale of goods could crop up under the Code as
easily as it did under the Sales Act.
67
But official comment 2 to section 2-313 casts a new light on
the problem:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct pur-
pose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a
contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not
designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth
which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either
to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They
may arise in other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of
bailments for hire, whether such bailment is itself the main con-
tract or is merely a supplying of containers under a contract for
the sale of their contents. The provisions of Section 2-318 on
third party beneficiaries expressly recognize this case law develop-
ment within one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is left
to the case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may
offer useful guidance in dealing wih further cases as they arise.
Thus, even though the Code does not expressly extend warranty pro-
tection to non-sales areas, it is not intended to disturb the case law
growth in these areas and offers itself as a basis for analogy. The
fiction of denominating a transaction a service in order to enable the
supplier to escape liability, as employed in the Sales Act blood trans-
fusion cases, has stunted the growth of warranty in non-sales areas.
Nevertheless, it should be obvious that implied warranty is a rapidly
expanding field whose limits have not yet been fully determined. The
gradual demise of the privity requirement manifests the modern policy
of affording warranty protection despite lack of a technical sale between
plaintiff and defendant.6" It is hoped that in future cases involving
the issue of warranties in blood transfusions, this policy will induce the
courts to look to the reasons for imposing a warranty, rather than the
form of the transaction.6"
66. Id. at §§ 2-312-15.
67. See Note, 18 OKLA. L. Riv. 104, 106 (1965), which argues that the Code
would impose a warranty for blood transfusions because a hospital could be a
"merchant" for purposes of section 2-314. This note, however, employs the severability
technique, which the courts have been unwilling to do. See note 34 supra and accom-
panying text.
68. See, e.g., Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
(1965), discussed in 25 MD. L. Rxv. 267 (1965), where an "innocent bystander"
recovered on an implied warranty theory against an ammunition manufacturer despite
lack of privity. See generally Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?,
1 DuQuEsNr L. Riv. 1 (1963).
69. The immediate prospects do not look promising. In Whitehurst v. American
National Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. 1965), decided shortly after Balkowitsch,
the court said, at 586: "Concluding as we do, that the furnishing of the blood by
the defendant, the American National Red Cross, to the plaintiff is a service and
not a sale, it is unnecessary to consider or discuss the policy aspects .. "
